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I. THE PROBLEM
The grand jury, with antecedents predating the petit jury,' re-
mains an integral part of American criminal justice machinery de-
spite more than one hundred and fifty years of severe criticism and
occasional abolition movements.2 It is preserved as an institution of
government by the fifth amendment, which requires prosecution by
grand jury indictment in all felony cases punishable by death or
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.3 While this clause is
applicable only to federal criminal prosecutions and is not binding
upon the states by way of the fourteenth amendment,4 the grand jury
process continues to be an essential component of state criminal
procedure. More than half of the states currently require prosecution
of all felonies by grand jury indictment,5 and even those states that
permit felony prosecution by a prosecutor's information have not
abolished the grand jury system. In these states, without exception,
local prosecutors may charge major offenses by either grand jury
indictment or information.' There is at present no significant move-
ment to amend the fifth amendment nor to eliminate the grand jury
process in state criminal prosecutions.7 Since use of the grand jury
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
For a history of the grand jury see L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY (1975): G. EDWARDS,
THE GRAND JURY (1906); R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL (1963). See also text accompany-
ing notes 67-85 infra.
2 Id. See note 104 infra.
3 The fifth amendment provides in part: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital.
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ....-
The term "infamous crime' is construed to mean any offense punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year or at hard labor. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
4 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). By the time Hurtado was decided a number
of states already had removed from their constitution the mandatory requirement of prosecu-
tion by indictment. See note 104 infra.
I See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 865 (4th
ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as KAMISAR]. For a survey of state requirements see Spain. The
Grand Jury, Past and Present: A Survey, 2 AM. CRiM. L.Q. 119, 126-42 (1964).
6 Id. In virtually all cases the decision to use the information or the indictment rests in
the discretion of the prosecutor, since it is the prosecutor who controls the events within the
grand jury room. See note 91 infra. In rare instances a "runaway" grand jury might insist upon
returning an indictment against a person whom the prosecutor would not charge with any
offense.
The grand jury remains a useful political tool of the prosecuting attorney. By submitting
a case to the grand jury instead of proceeding by information, the prosecutor can create the
impression that the decision to prosecute, or not to prosecute as the case may be. is solely that
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offers the prosecution significant benefits that are not otherwise
available, any abolition effort may expect serious opposition. It is
safe to assume that grand juries will be with us for some time to
come.,
There are many statements in the cases and commentary cele-
brating the claimed historic purpose and function of the grand jury
as the protector of the innocent from oppressive governmental prose-
cution.9 But the grand jury remains, as it has always been, the accusa-
torial arm of the executive."0 Its real purpose is "to decide whether
or not there is sufficient evidence to justify the standing of trial. '",
In most jurisdictions today, the standard for determining
whether the evidence is sufficient to justify putting the accused to trial
is stated either in terms of probable cause or a prima facie case. The
grand jury may be instructed that an indictment should be returned
only if there is probable cause to believe the accused is guilty of the
offense: "And probable cause exists only when there is competent
evidence, direct or circumstantial, before you which leads you, as
reasonable persons, to believe that the defendant is guilty of the
offense charged."'" Or the jury may be told that the state must show
a prima facie case before an indictment is justified:
of the grand jury. In addition, effective use of the grand jury may help to create a public image
of the prosecutor as an anticrime crusader. For these reasons, and others, few prosecutors
indorse the abolition movement. In addition, few defense lawyers and civil libertarians urge
abolition of the federal grand jury since it would require repeal or modification of the fifth
amendment, an event that could create a dangerous precedent and imperil the self-incrimination
clause as well as other constitutional freedoms. A safer approach is to urge statutory reform
of the grand jury process. See, e.g., L. CLARK, supra note I, at 124-45 (1975).
At the state level, proposals for reform come as suggestions for modification rather than
elimination of the grand jury. See, e.g., Major Changes Urged in Grand Jury System, Colum-
bus Dispatch, Sept. 29, 1976, § A at 8 (report of the Ohio Constitutional Review Commission
committee on the grand jury).
"In the light of our federal constitutional guarantee, suggestions for its abolition are
somewhat visionary." 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.02[l1][a], at 6-11 (2d ed. 1976).
1 Historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function
in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused . . . to determine
whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power
or by malice and personal ill will.
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
11 For discussion of the origin and history of the grand jury as an arm of the executive
branch see G. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 2.
1 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 144-45 (1947). Of course,
it may be fair to say that the protective function is subsumed within the accusatorial func-
tion-Le., the grand jury, if it performs properly, will protect the innocent from oppressive
prosecution by its very decision as to whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a trial.
Nonetheless, the grand jury was not conceived as a protective institution and is regarded by
few as such today.
12 Yankwich, J., Charge to Grand Jury, 16 F.R.D. 93, 94 (1955).
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If there is inadequate evidence to prove that defendant committed
the crime, the jurors should vote against indictment. The evidence
before them is usually only the government's case and if this will
not, although uncontradicted, prove defendant guilty he should not
be indicted at all.13
In either case, when an indictment is returned by the grand jury,
the consequences extend beyond merely deciding that the subject of
the inquiry should be accused of a crime. The decision to indict
carries with it significant and often unrecognized fourth amendment
implications. If the accused is not under arrest at the time of indict-
ment, an arrest warrant is issued by the court without further judicial
inquiry into probable cause. 4 Or, if the defendant has been arrested
and is in custody or released on bail, the indictment itself precludes
further inquiry into the legal cause justifying further detention or
continued conditions of release. 15 Thus the decision to indict operates
as a fourth amendment probable cause determination to arrest or
detain in custody;"6 it is the decision of the grand jury rather than a
magistrate which leads to detention. Sanctioned by tradition and
custom, the grand jury exercises this fourth amendment function in
virtually all American jurisdictions. Nonetheless, analysis of rela-
tively recent developments in the fourth amendment and grand jury
areas suggests that it is time to reconsider the fourth amendment
function of the grand jury. The Supreme Court has yet to address
directly the question of whether the procedure is constitutionally ac-
ceptable.
A somewhat parallel question was raised in Gerstein v. Pugh,'7
in which the issue was whether the filing of a prosecutor's information
alone could be a legal basis for detaining an accused prior to trial.
Under the Florida procedure, a prosecuting attorney could charge
Any noncapital offense by information without any prior probable
cause hearing, and the filing of an information foreclosed any right
to a subsequent probable cause hearing. 8 In operation, the effect of
the procedure was that the accused could be arrested and detained in
Fletcher, J., Charge to a Grand Jury, 18 F.R.D. 211, 215 (1956).
" See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(a): "Upon the request of the attorney for the government
the court shall issue a warrant for each defendant named . . . in the indictment."
'" This policy is reflected by the traditional rule that the return of an indictment forecloses
the defendant's right to a preliminary hearing. See. e.g.. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c): Onto R. CRIM.
P. 5(B). Michigan is perhaps the only jurisdiction which provides for a preliminary examination
after indictment. See People v. Duncan, 388 Mich. 489, 201 N.W.2d 629 (1972).
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "[Alnd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation ..
17 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
11 Id. at 105-06.
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custody for a period of more than a month before arraignment, the
first appearance before a judge at which the issue of probable cause
could be raised.' 9 There was no point in the process at which the
prosecuting attorney was required to show probable cause to justify
the arrest and detention. 0 The Court unanimously found the Florida
procedure constitutionally deficient under established fourth amend-
ment principles requiring that the accused be afforded "a judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended re-
straint of liberty following arrest."'" Moreover, the probable cause
decision must be made by a neutral and detached magistrate;
the prosecuting attorney's decision to file an information could not
serve as a probable cause determination because "a prosecutor's re-
sponsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional
role of a neutral and detached magistrate. 2 2 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that when an information is filed, the accused must be
afforded a "fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a
condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or
promptly after arrest. ' 2
Should not the same principles govern when the accused is
charged by grand jury indictment? Should not there be a probable
cause determination by a neutral and detached magistrate to justify
arrest or detention following indictment? Unless the grand jury pro-
cess itself is structured to preserve the fourth amendment values
served by a neutral and detached magistrate, the Pugh rationale
should require an independent probable cause decision in every case,
whether instituted by a prosecutor's information or a grand jury
indictment.
Although these questions were not at issue in Pugh, Mr. Justice
Powell, writing for the Court, volunteered in a footnote the view that
a person charged by indictment would not be entitled to a probable
11 Id. at 106. Whether it could be raised at arraignment under Florida procedures was
unclear, but the Fifth Circuit had "assumed, without deciding, that this was true." Id. at 106
n.4.
20 Even when an information is verified, it rarely contains facts sufficient to establish
probable cause in the fourth amendment sense. The information is a formal charge, usually
drafted in the language of the penal statute, and contains little more than allegations of the
essential elements of the crime charged. It is required only to meet the sixth amendment
demand that the accused "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." Cf. Russell
v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962). Different factual allegations are required to
justify a search or seizure under the fourth amendment. See text accompanying notes 133-44
infra: Kinnaird v. State, 251 Ind. 506, 242 N.E.2d 500 (1968).
21 420 U.S. at 114.
2 Id. at 117.
Id. at 125.
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cause determination because the grand jury itself is an acceptable
substitute for a neutral and detached magistrate:
By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon its
face," and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury," conclu-
sively determines the existence of probable cause and requires issu-
ance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry. . . .The willing-
ness to let a grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a neutral
and detached magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's relation-
ship to the courts and its historical role of protecting individuals
from unjust prosecution. 2
The language of the footnote is not without some prior judicial
support. In Ex parte United States,2 the district judge refused to
issue an arrest warrant upon the return of an indictment, claiming
only that the issuance of a warrant is a "matter . ..within the
judicial discretion of the court. ' 2 Without distinguishing the concept
of probable cause to indict from that of probable cause to arrest, the
Court, by mandamus, ordered the district judge to issue the warrant.2Y
Observing that the refusal to issue a warrant may in practical effect
frustrate the prosecution since the defendant could not be tried in
absentia, the Court concluded:
The question whether there was probable cause for putting the ac-
cused on trial was for the grand jury to determine, and the indict-
ment being fair on its face, the court to which it was returned, upon
the application of the United States attorney, should have issued the
warrant as a matter of course ...
[ .. T]he finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a
properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the exist-
ence of probable cause for the purpose of holding the accused to
answer.2S
However, the decision in Ex parte United States does not provide
conclusive support for Mr. Justice Powell's fourth amendment
theory, since it was not decided on fourth amendment grounds.29 The
district judge did not claim that the warrant should not issue because
21 Id. at 117 n.19 (citations omitted).
' 287 U.S. 241 (1932).
24 Id. at 245.
21 It should be noted that the Court in Pugh suggests strongly that the two probable cause
standards are not identical. A person may be charged with an offense on less than fourth
amendment probable cause so long as he suffers no restraint on liberty more severe than the
requirement of appearing for trial. See text accompanying notes 34-39 infra.
287 U.S. at 249-50.
" Indeed the decision is not cast in any constitutional terms; moreover, the Court has
never held that to be indicted by a grand jury on less than probable cause is a violation of the
defendant's right under the fifth amendment.
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the grand jury lacked sufficient evidence before it to establish prob-
able cause to arrest. His only justification was that the decision to
issue a warrant was within his judicial discretion. With no discussion
of the relationship of the fourth amendment to the grand jury process,
the Court merely held that a district judge is without discretion to
withhold a warrant when an indictment is returned by "a properly
constituted grand jury. '3°
Later, in Giordenello v. United States'3 the Court did discuss
in dictum the fourth amendment-grand jury relationship. Finding a
complaint insufficient on its face to establish fourth amendment
probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant, the Court sug-
gested that when a grand jury finds probable cause to indict, ipso
facto it has found probable cause for arrest.3 2 Mr. Justice Powell's
footnote in Pugh cites and relies upon both Ex parte United States
and Giordenello.3
The footnote and cases cited in support are consistent with estab-
lished constitutional principles only if probable cause to indict is an
evidentiary standard that is equal to, or greater than, probable cause
to arrest and detain under the fourth amendment. If it is permissible
to indict on evidence that is less than would be required to arrest and
detain, then there is a clear fourth amendment violation constructed
into the rationale of the footnote and the language of Exparte United
States and Giordenello. While the Court has left undecided the dis-
tinctions, if any, between probable cause to indict and fourth amend-
ment probable cause, it did touch upon the issues in Pugh. The Court
carefully noted that the absence of a probable cause determination
affected only the validity of the restraint on liberty and did not invali-
date the information that was filed.34 Thus, in the absence of a
probable cause determination, the accused is entitled to be released
from custody, but is not entitled to dismissal of the charge. The
probable cause determination is "required only for those suspects
who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition that they
1 287 U.S. at 250.
31 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
32 It does not avail the Government to argue that because a warrant of arrest
may be issued as of course upon an indictment, this complaint was adequate since
its allegations would suffice for an indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 7(c). A warrant of arrest can be based upon an indictment because the grand
jury's determination that probable cause existed for the indictment also establishes
that element for the purpose of issuing a warrant for the apprehension of the person
so charged.
Id. at 487.
3 420 U.S. at 117 n.19.
11 Id. at 119.
FOURTH AMENDMENT FUNCTION
appear for trial." The fourth amendment probable cause determi-
nation "is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging deci-
sion. ' ' 36 Unless a higher standard is imposed upon grand jury indict-
ments than upon prosecutors' informations, the rationale of Pugh
recognizes a qualitatively different standard for the charging decision
than is required for the fourth amendment determination. Accord-
ingly, a grand jury indictment should raise no presumption, conclu-
sive or otherwise, of probable cause to arrest and detain. Moreover,
even if the same evidentiary standard were required to be met for
indictment, the grand jury would not be an acceptable substitute for
a fourth amendment magistrate.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT MAGISTRATE
Pugh recognized the established rule that the fourth amendment
requires a probable cause decision by a neutral and detached magis-
trate .3 To accept the proposition that an indictment "fair upon its
face" and returned by a "properly constituted grand jury" conclu-
sively determines the existence of probable cause and requires the
issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry,38 one must
conclude that a grand jury possesses those characteristics required of
a neutral and detached magistrate. In Justice Powell's view, "[tihe
willingness to let a grand jury's judgment substitute for that of a
neutral and detached magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's
relationship to the courts and its historical role of protecting individu-
als from unjust prosecution." 9 But more is required of a neutral and
detached magistrate than a historical role of protecting the innocent
from oppressive prosecution. More than once the Court has been
called upon to describe the essential qualities of a fourth amendment
magistrate, and in light of its decisions it clearly is improper to
Id. at 125 n.26.
' Id.
"To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection against unfounded invasions of
liberty and privacy, the Court has required that the existence of probable cause be decided by
a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible." 420 U.S. at 112. Although an arrest
may be made by a police officer on the street, the fourth amendment requires a determination
of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate "as a prerequisite to extended restraint
of liberty following arrest." Id. at 114.
31 Id. at 117 n.19.
2, Id. Cited in support of this conclusion is the case of United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974). At issue in Calandra was whether a witness summoned before a grand jury
may refuse to answer questions on the ground that the questions are the product of an unlawful
search and seizure. While the case contains language praising the grand jury as the protector
of the innocent, it does not discuss the question of whether the grand jury is an adequate
substitute for a neutral and detached magistrate. Although Justice Powell is the author of the
majority opinion in Calandra, his reliance on that case in Pugh may be misplaced.
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entrust the fourth amendment function to the grand jury.
The core of the decision in Pugh is the reaffirmance of the estab-
lished fourth amendment principle that the prosecuting attorney can-
not serve the function of a fourth amendment magistrate. The Consti-
tution requires that the probable cause decision to arrest be made by
a neutral and detached magistrate independent of police and prosecu-
tion.4" Since, under the Florida procedure, the decision to charge by
information was solely within the discretion of the prosecuting attor-
ney, and the filing of an information resulted in the arrest or contin-
ued detention of the accused, the system in effect invested the prose-
cuting attorney with the power to determine fourth amendment prob-
able cause. With ample precedent, the Court found the Florida proce-
dure unconstitutional, quoting from the classic statement in Johnson
v. United States:"1
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support
of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out-
crime . 2
Whoever else may be included within the definition of a "neutral
and detached magistrate, ' '42.1 it is clear that it does not encompass
prosecutors or police, participants in the "competitive enterprise"
who cannot be expected to maintain an impartial view of their own
work product. Moreover, because the enterprise is competitive and
time may be of the essence, arrest and search decisions of government
agents may often be hurried as well as zealous. 3 Recognition of
these realities underpins the constitutional policy against warrantless
41 420 U.S. at 112-19.
41 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). Johnson involved the validity of a search rather than an
arrest. But the fourth amendment governs both. The probable cause decision must be made by
a neutral and detached magistrate before a warrant may issue for either an arrest or a search.
In Johnson the Court concluded that the determination must be made by a "judicial officer,
not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Id. at 14.
42 420 U.S. at 112-13 (quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14). Seealso Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966): "The requirement that a warrant be obtained is a requirement
that the inferences to support the search 'be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.'
42.1 A magistrate who is paid a fee for issuing a warrant but receives no remuneration
when a warrant is denied does not qualify as a "neutral and detached" magistrate for fourth
amendment purposes. Connally v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. 546 (1977).
4 In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932), the Court observed:
Indeed, the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to
issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitu-
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searches except in well-defined circumstances in which the need for
immediate action outweighs the need to interpose a disinterested
magistrate between police and citizen." Although the constitutional
policy differs in the context of arrest, there being no general require-
ment of a warrant," there remains a judicial preference for the war-
rant process" since an arrest warrant serves the same fourth amend-
ment values as a search warrant:
The arrest warrant procedure serves to insure that the deliberate,
impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed between
the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the
information which the complaining officer adduces as probable
cause.
4 7
The preference for the warrant process is consistent with the
statement in Pugh that "once the suspect is in custody, . . .the
tion are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may
happen to make arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be
attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity
of petty officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons
accused of crime.
The policy favoring the warrant process was restated in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
270-71 (1960):
In a doubtful case, when the officer does not have clearly convincing evidence of the
immediate need to search, it is most important that resort be had to a warrant, so
that the evidence in the possession of the police may be weighed by an independent
judicial officer, whose decision, not that of the police, may govern whether liberty
or privacy is to be invaded.
" However, where there are no circumstances excusing the necessity of a search warrant,
a warrantless search may be invalid even though the police had information which would be
sufficient to establish probable cause before a magistrate. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967):
Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful "notwithstanding
facts unquestionably showing probable cause," . . . for the Constitution requires
"that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . ..be interposed
between the citizen and the police ... . . "Over and over again this Cou'ra has
emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to
judicial processes," . . . and that searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or the magistrate, are perse unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions. [Citations omitted].
41 United States v. Watson, 96 S.Ct. 820 (1976). The Court based its holding in part on
the fact that an express act of Congress had given postal employees power to arrest felons
without a warrant, and that acts of Congress carry a "strong presumption of constitutionality."
Id. at 824.
41 Law enforcement officers may find it wise to seek arrest warrants where
practicable to do so, and their judgments about probable cause may be more readily
accepted where backed by a warrant issued by a magistrate. . . .But we decline to
transform this judicial preference into a constitutional rule . . ..
Id. at 827-28.
41 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
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reasons that justify [a warrantless arrest] . ..evaporate."48 Thus,
after the suspect is arrested, a probable cause determination must be
made by a magistrate. Similarly, the fourth amendment requires that
an officer seeking a warrant make a particularized showing of prob-
able cause before the magistrate. 9 To require less would reduce the
function of the magistrate to that of a "rubber stamp" for the offi-
cer's conclusory allegations of probable cause."
That a prosecuting attorney does not qualify as a neutral and
detached magistrate for purposes of the fourth amendment was de-
cided prior to Pugh. In Mancusi v. DeForte,5" the Court held that a
subpoena duces tecum issued by the district attorney could not serve
the function of a search warrant because of the absence of the
"indispensable condition" that the inferences from facts to establish
probable cause be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate in-
stead of the officer engaged in the "competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime." 5 Later, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,3 the search
warrant was held invalid because it was issued by the state attorney
general acting in his capacity as a justice of the peace. The attorney
general later served as the chief trial attorney, and he had issued an
arrest and search warrant after he had taken charge of all police
activities relating to the case. Under these circumstances, the attor-
ney general could not qualify as a neutral and detached magistrate
because "prosecutors and policemen simply cannot be asked to main-
tain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own investiga-
tions-the 'competitive enterprise' that must rightly engage their
single-minded attention. ' 5 Thus the essential quality of the fourth
amendment magistrate is that it be "someone independent of police
and prosecution."55
420 U.S. at 114.
' Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967). The requirement of showing particularized
facts to establish probable cause is significant, since no similar requirement exists when the
officer seeks an indictment before a grand jury. Thus, the officer may seek and obtain an
indictment on conclusory, hearsay evidence which would not support the issuance of a warrant
by a magistrate. See note 154 infra.
" In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964), the Court observed that since the
informed and deliberate determination of a magistrate is preferred over the hurried action of a
police officer engaged in the "competitive enterprise," the facts presented to the magistrate
must be sufficient for an independent evaluation or the fourth amendment is reduced to a
nullity. The magistrate must perform "his 'neutral and detached' function and not serve merely
as a rubber stamp for the police." See also United States v. V'ntresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109
(1965).
5' 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
52 Id. at 371.
53 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Id. at 450.
420 U.S. at 118.
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In Shadwick v. City of Tampa," the Court defined the two
essential qualities of a neutral and detached magistrate as "de-
tachment" and "capacity." At issue was a provision in the Tampa
city charter authorizing municipal court clerks to issue arrest war-
rants for city ordinance violations. The clerks were not judicial offi-
cers, nor were they required to be lawyers or to have any formal
legal training. They performed no judicial duties other than the
issuance of warrants. Notwithstanding several prior decisions that
had used the term "judicial officer" to describe the fourth amend-
ment magistrate, 7 the Court concluded that the Constitution does not
require someone who is a judge or formally a member of the judicial
branch of government:
Past decisions of the Court have mentioned review by a "judi-
cial officer" prior to issuance of a warrant. . . . In some cases the
term "judicial officer" appears to have been used interchangeably
with that of "magistrate." . . . In others, it was intended simply to
underscore the now accepted fact that someone independent of the
police and prosecution must determine probable cause. . . . The
very term "judicial officer" implies, of course, some connection
with the judicial branch. But it has never been held that only a
lawyer or judge could grant a warrant, regardless of the court sys-
tem or the type of warrant involved.5"
The Court noted that prior to 1968 United States Commissioners
were not required to be lawyers, and that under the Federal Magis-
trates Act of 196859 part-time magistrates need not be lawyers."0
407 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1972).
' E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
407 U.S. at 348. The Court emphasized the fact that the city clerks were subject to
supervision by a municipal court judge and, therefore, had some connection with the judiciary.
A different question would have been raised if the clerks were entirely removed from the
judiciary.
Many pesons may not qualify as the kind of "public civil officers" we have come to
associate with the term "magistrate." Had the Tampa clerk been entirely divorced
from a judicial position, this case would have presented different considerations.
Here, however, the clerk is an employee of the judicial branch of the city of Tampa,
disassociated from the role of law enforcement.
Id. at 352.
5' 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(1) (1970).
" 407 U.S. at 349 n. 8. Many states continue to permit nonlawyers to hold judicial offices
in the lower courts. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1905.01 (Page Supp. 1975) (mayor's
court).
At least two states have held that it is a denial of fundamental constitutional rights to
subject a criminal defendant to a trial before a nonlawyer judge. "Since our legal system regards
denial of counsel as a denial of fundamental fairness, it logically follows that the failure to
provide a judge qualified to comprehend and utilize counsel's legal arguments likewise must
be considered a denial of due process." Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 332, 525 P.2d
72, 78, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 638 (1974). A similar result was reached in the case of In re Judicial
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Under the circumstances present in Shadwick, the Court decided that
nonlawyers could be entrusted with the fourth amendment responsi-
bilities of determining probable cause and issuing warrants.6 '
However, it must be recognized that in many cases the determi-
nation of probable cause may require considerable legal expertise.
Often the elements of felonies and regulatory offenses are numerous
and complex, and while the limitations on the kinds of evidence upon
which the magistrate may rely in determining probable cause are not
many, they too are quite complex.6 2 Accordingly, nonlawyers may
not always have the capacity required of a magistrate. In Shadwick,
the Court held that "an issuing magistrate must meet two tests. He
must be neutral and detached, and he must be capable of determining
whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search. 6 3
Since the warrant process represents an independent assurance that
a search or arrest will not proceed until probable cause is shown to
exist, that assurance would be lacking if the case involved legal or
evidentiary issues beyond the ken of the magistrate.
The requirement of capacity was met in Shadwick for two rea-
sons. First, the clerks were authorized to issue warrants for ordinance
violations, but not for offenses under the state code. Since the ordi-
Interpretation of 1975 Senate Enrolled Act No. 441, 332 N.E.2d 97, 98 (Ind. 1975). The court
found unconstitutional a statute that provided for lay judges, observing that "the potential
deprivation of due process as to persons charged with a crime in such courts requires us to hold
that the qualifications to hold such a position as county judge can be no less than the qualifica-
tions required of an attorney who is permitted to represent such persons in those courts."
In North v. Russell, 96 S. Ct. 2709 (1976), the Supreme Court held
that the Kentucky two-tier trial court system with lay judicial officers in the first tier
in smaller cities and an appeal of right with a de novo trial before a traditionally
law-trained judge in the second does not violate either the due process or equal
protection guarantees of the Constitution of the United States ....
Id. at 2714. Presumably, it was the trial de novo feature that saved the procedure from being
found unconstitutional. In dissent, Mr. Justice Stewart noted that:
A judge ignorant of the law is simply incapable of performing these [judiciall func-
tions. If he is aware of his incompetence, such a judge will perhaps instinctively turn
to the prosecutor for advice and direction. But such a practice no more than com-
pounds the due process violation.
Id. at 2717.
62 An examination of the Court's decision reveals that the terms "magistrate"
and "judicial officer" have been used interchangeably. Little attempt was made to
define either term, to distinguish the one from the other, or to advance one as the
definitive Fourth Amendment requirement. We find no commandment in either
term, however, that all warrant authority must reside exclusively in a lawyer or
judge. Such a requirement would have been incongruous when even within the federal
system warrants were until recently widely issued by nonlawyers.
407 U.S. at 349.
12 See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964). See text accompanying notes 140-43 infra.
0 407 U.S. at 350.
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nances included only common misdemeanor offenses, and excluded
complex felonies, formal legal training was not required by the fourth
amendment. Second, as clerks they were exposed to the content and
meaning of the municipal ordinances on a daily basis, and functioned
under the direct supervision of the municipal courts. The Court found
that the requirement of capacity was met with the observation that:
The clerk's authority extends only to the issuance of arrest warrants
for breach of municipal ordinances. We presume from the nature
of the clerk's position that he would be able to deduce from the facts
on an affidavit before him whether there was probable cause to
believe a citizen guilty of impaired driving, breach of peace, drun-
kenness, trespass, or the multiple other common offenses covered
by a municipal code. There has been no showing that this is too
difficult a task for a clerk to accomplish."
The clerks satisfied the detachment requirement as well since they
were not involved with police or prosecution in any way that might
distort an independent, unbiased judgment of probable cause. The
Court found the essence of detachment to be "severance and disen-
gagement" from the functions of police and prosecution:
Whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail, it is clear
that they require severance and disengagement from activities of
law enforcement. There has been no showing whatever here of par-
tiality, or affiliation of these clerks with prosecutors or police. The
record shows no connection with any law enforcement activity or
authority which would distort the independent judgment the Fourth
Amendment requires.65
The Tampa clerk was detached because he was "removed from prose-
cutor or police and works within the judicial branch subject to the
supervision of the municipal court judge." '"
Applying the tests of Shadwick, one might ask whether the
grand jury can satisfy the dual fourth amendment requirements of
detachment and capacity. Unlike the Tampa city clerks, grand jurors
must make probable cause decisions with respect to the most complex
felonies. Grand jurors are not lawyers and few have had any signifi-
cant experience with the legal system prior to their terms of service.
From the standpoint of experience and training, grand jurors are less
" Id. at 351. The Court further stated: "Our legal system has long entrusted nonlawyers
to evaluate more complex and significant factual data than that in the case at hand. Grand
juries daily determine probable cause prior to rendering indictments, and trial juries assess
whether guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 351-52.
's 407 U.S. at 350-51.
Id. at 351.
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capable of the fourth amendment function than the Tampa clerks.
Nor do they fare better with respect to the requirement of detach-
ment. Grand juries are not, in reality, "severed and disengaged" from
the pro'secuting attorney. Instead, the law places the grand jury in a
position of dependency upon the office of the prosecutor. The argu-
ments are persuasive that fourth amendment responsibilities are mis-
placed with the grand jury.
III. THE DETACHMENT OF THE GRAND JURY
A. Historical Development
The origin of the grand jury system in England is obscured by its
antiquity. In its modern form, the institution can be traced to 1368,
when it became the custom to call a panel of twenty-four, le graunde
inquest, to inquire into criminal activity in the county. 7 However, its
roots can be found as early as 1166 in the inquest process established
by the Assize of Clarendon." From the beginning it was an accusa-
torial body acting as an arm of the court, "ferreting" out drime in
the locality." In its early form, the inquest lacked the independence
that is today claimed to be its greatest virtue. Singly and collectively,
the jurors were answerable to the court and could be required to
report the reasons underlying their decisions and the evidence upon
which they had acted.70 The proceedings were not conducted in secret.
The courts could, and often did, monitor the progress of the inquest.7'
Prior to the development of trial by jury, the inquest served the
functions of both accuser and prosecutor since the effect of an accusa-
tion was almost certain conviction. 72
The grand jury did not begin to assume its modern form until
the development of the rule of secrecy, the event described as "the
seed . . . which was destined to change the grand jury from a mere
instrument of the crown to a strong independent power which stood
steadfast between the crown and the people in the defence of the
liberty of the citizen. ' 73 The rule was established in Bracton's time;
" G. EDWARDS, supra note I, at 2.
Id. at 7. Thus, le graunde inquest, while the beginning of the institution we recognize
today as the grand jury, was "but the new branch of a tree already firmly rooted among English
institutions." Id. at 26.
11 Id. at 27.
70 Id.
1 Id.
7 Under the provisions of the Assize of Clarendon the injured party gave evidence before
a group of 16 who would decide whether to return an accusation. Since the accused was limited
to trial by ordeal, a test which few, if any, survived, the accusation itself was tantamount to a
finding of guilt. L. CLARK, supra note 1, at 8-9.
3 G. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 27.
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later, an oath of secrecy was also demanded of the jurors. The pur-
pose of the rule, however, was not to strengthen the grand jury as an
independent institution. It was designed only to prevent the subject
of the inquest from fleeing upon learning of the investigation. The
grand jury could not yet claim to be an independent body standing
between subject and king, for the jury remained accountable to the
court and could be interrogated and required to justify its verdicts.74
Final acceptance of the concept of grand jury secrecy occurred
at about the time of the passing of trial by ordeal and its replacement
with trial by jury. Since petit jurors were selected, in part, because
of their personal knowledge of the facts of the case, and could be held
accountable for their verdicts, it was no longer thought necessary that
the grand jury remain subject to interrogation with respect to the
accusation decision.75 In time, grand jury proceedings were not only
secret but jurors were not accountable to the courts. It is these attrib-
utes which are claimed to have transformed the grand jury into a
strong independent power standing between the people and the "un-
just designs of the government."76
B. Role as "Defender of the People"
The claim is often made that historically the grand jury has
served effectively as the defender of the people against unjust and
overzealous prosecution. Review of the cases cited in support of this
claim suggests that the grand jury has been more effective in frustrat-
ing prosecutions by an unpopular government regardless of whether
prosecution was legally justified. Two early cases often cited as his-
torical examples of the protective function of the grand jury are those
of Stephen Colledge and the Earl of Shaftesbury, described by one
historian as the "two most celebrated instances of the fearless action
of the grand jury in defending the liberty of the subject . . . ,,I It
is more likely, however, that refusal to indict in those cases merely
reflected the jurors' political sentiment against an unpopular mon-
arch rather than a considered decision that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to justify criminal prosecution. 8
4 Id.
1' Id. at 27-28. At the same time, with the passing of trial by ordeal, the grand jury, for
obvious reasons, became a less terrible and powerful prosecutorial agency. See L. CLARK, supra
note I. at 9.
" G. EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 28.
hId.
, The Earl of Shaftesbury and his follower Stephen Colledge, political opponents of
Charles II, were subjected by the King to London grand jury inquests on charges of treason.
The London grand juries refused to indict either, insisting upon secrecy and independence from
the court, despite considerable pressure from the King. Many commentators rely on these cases
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The history of the grand jury in this country also does not indi-
cate that it has served institutionally to protect innocent citizens from
unfounded criminal charges. Often it has served to protect law viola-
tors, rather than the innocent, especially during times of political
stress when the jurors agreed with the views of the subject of inquest.
During the colonial and revolutionary periods grand juries regularly
refused to indict rum runners, smugglers, and other law violators
perceived by the jurors as opponents of England and, therefore,
"patriots.""9 Before the Civil War, southern grand juries attempted
to further their regional interests by using the criminal process
against those perceived as opponents and by sheltering the friendly
from criminal prosecution." After the war, grand juries in the South
were in the forefront of the struggle against Reconstructionists and
carpetbaggers, and often shielded the Ku Klux Klan from prosecu-
tion."'
If there is any historical lesson to be taken from our experience
with grand juries, it is that they, perhaps more than most democratic
political institutions, reflect the passions and prejudices of thie com-
munity. "The grand jury never developed fully into a 'neutral' institu-
tion scrupulously sifting the evidence and providing protection only
for the innocent." 2 Popular causes and individuals have been pro-
tected even though lawless, while the unpopular have been harassed
and prosecuted without just cause.3 In the states, grand jurors gener-
for the claim that the grand jury had become the protector of the innocent. Professor Clark
points out, however, that the grand juries in London were composed of pro-Anglicans whose
political sympathies were with the accused. Charles later went to Oxford to assemble a more
favorable grand jury and Colledge was indicted, convicted, and executed. Shaftesbury fled
England (as did the foreman of the London grand jury) to avoid the'same fate. L. CLARK, supra
note I, at 9-12.
n Id. at 16-18. Throughout the revolution the grand jury was an important political body
which vocally denounced British oppression and protected patriots. Id. Judges used the charge
to the grand jury as a forum to vent political views. R. YOUNGER, supra note 1. at 19, 27-40.
Often the effect of grand jury refusal to indict for blatant violations was to nullify the law.
88 R. YOUNGER, supra note 1, at 85-105.
SI Id. at 106-33. Similarly, the grand juries often were the focal point of the struggle in
Utah between Mormons and Christians. Id. at 171-77.
"I L. CLARK, supra note 1, at 20.
"[Iln periods of severe political stress, or when a locality or the nation has
been caught up in some intense ideological struggle, the grand jurors have shared
the political sympathies of the prosecuting agent, and unpopular accused people have
not been protected against improper or politically inspired charges." Id. at 26.
Professor Clark suggests that the Nixon administration used the grand jury effectively to
harass a wide range of dissidents and critics. The grand jury was used effectively as a weapon
in itself even where convictions could not be obtained. The Internal Security Division of the
Justice Department, headed by Guy Goodwin, conducted over 100 grand jury investigations,
calling 1,000 to 2,000 witnesses over a three-year period. Yet, only 200 indictments were
returned, and of those that came to trial only ten percent resulted in convictions. Id. at 49-50.
In an earlier era, grand juries were used against union organizers when union activities were
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ally have agreed with the view of the local prosecuting attorney who
was elected by popular vote,81 and it is unlikely that many jurors have
viewed the prosecutor as a potential threat to innocent citizens. Thus,
while the grand jury may have been instrumental in achieving a
rough, popularly acceptable justice in America, it is doubtful that
historically it served "as a primary security to the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution.""
C. The Grand Jury Today
There is no evidence that the grand jury of today is any more a
bulwark of liberty than in the past. In addition to being placed by
the law in a situation of dependency upon the prosecuting attorney,
grand jurors are, for the most part, sympathetic to the views and
goals of the prosecutor. Rather than perceiving their function as the
guardian against prosecutorial excess, most jurors probably have a
sense of being part of a joint struggle with the prosecutor against the
criminal element of the community. 6 Thus the primary function of
the grand jury remains that of the accuser and not the defender of
the people,87 and in performing this function it must establish and
viewed as a threat to freedom. A notable example was the conspiracy indictment againt Eugene
V. Debs in 1894 as a result of the Pullman strike. See R. YOUNGER, supra note 1, at 214-16.
" Although federal district attorneys are appointed, most state prosecutors are elected
officials, and it is at the state level that most criminal matters are processed. A common method
of juror selection is by use of voters lists, which most often results in a jury reflecting values of
the majority of the community with little or no representation of minority groups. Accordingly,
it is fair to speculate that grand juries are not often at odds with the prosecutor. The reported
instances in which juries have opposed their prosecutors usually involved cases of alleged
political corruption. The most celebrated triumphs of the grand jury in this country as an
independent institution, and perhaps the only significant instances of resistance to prosecutorial
control, involved struggles against local political figures in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. In 1872 the infamous Tweed Ring was smashed by a grand jury acting without
the assistance of the official prosecutor. See R. YOUNGER, supra note I, at 182-86. The public
image of the grand jury improved further during Thomas E. Dewey's anti-racketeering
campaign in the 1930's. Id. at 234-36.
' Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
" Perhaps the demands made upon the grand jury are inconsistent with human experience.
It is asked both to investigate criminal activity and return an accusation, as well as to carefully
sift and weigh the evidence as the defender of the innocent. It may be too much to ask of any
group that it objectively analyze its own work product in this manner. It has been suggested
that in fact the prosecuting attorney more often serves as the defender of the people against
grand jury excesses. "Realistically, the most demanding task faced by a conscientious prosecu-
tor in a grand jury room is that of making a defendant's rights understandable to a grand jury
bent on indicting without sufficient evidence but upon great provocation." Antell, The Modern
Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153, 155 (1965). One author suggests
that the functions of investigation and indictment be separated so that the grand jury would
not be required to do both. L. CLARK, supra note 1, at 142-43.
0 Many assume that if the accusatorial function is performed properly, the natural by-
product will be protection of the innocent. See, e.g., G. EDWARDS, supra note !, at 37:
Primarily the object of the grand jury is not to protect the innocent, for all accused
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maintain a close working relationship with the prosecuting attorney.
In performing both its accusatorial and its investigative duties,
the grand jury has evolved into a passive body. While it is the formal
responsibility of the grand jury to investigate criminal activity to
determine whether an indictment should be returned, the jury itself
does very little investigating. Instead, the prosecuting attorney and
police conduct their own investigations, since "an obvious limitation"
on the jury's ability to initiate and conduct investigations is the total
absence of investigative personnel and resources independent of po-
lice and prosecutor." Without the prosecutor's guidance, the grand
jury lacks the experience and expertise necessary to conduct even a
moderate-sized investigation. 9 Since the prosecutor can control the
amount and quality of evidence produced by the grand jury
"investigation," the decision to return an indictment frequently is no
more than a perfunctory approval of the prosecutor's wishes based
upon very little evidence.9
Furthermore, the events that occur within the grand jury room
are largely within the control of the prosecuting attorney.9 1 In vir-
persons are presumed innocent until the contrary is shown, but is to accuse those
persons, who, upon the evidence submitted by the prosecutor, if uncontradicted,
would cause the grand jurors to believe the defendant guilty of the offense charged.
8R KAMISAR, supra note 5, at 879 note g.
11 See Antell, supra note 86, at 155: "The so-called grand jury 'investigation'. .. is really
nothing more than a review of the prosecutor's predigested evidence and a ratification of his
conclusions." At least one federal court recognizes that a grand jury subpoena is, in reality,
an instrumentality of the prosecutor. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir.
1973).
" Indictments may be based entirely upon a single affidavit of a police officer or an oral
summary of such an affidavit by a prosecutor. A Philadelphia study showed that in 80-90
percent of the cases brought before a grand jury the affidavit of a police officer (who never
appeared before the grand jury) was the only evidence presented. Indictments were seldom
refused because of the slim evidence presented. See Bray, Not-So-Grand Juries, Wall St. J.,
July 29, 1971, at 1. In Parton v. State, 455 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970), the indictment
was based solely on the prosecutor's oral summary of evidence given before a prior grand jury
that had refused to indict. While the court on appeal disapproved of the practice, it refused to
dismiss the indictment, citing the established rule that the sufficiency of the evidence before a
grand jury is not subject to review by the courts.
', In no jurisdiction is the prosecutor given express authority to control the grand jury.
The control results from the fact that the grand jury is virtually unable to institute criminal
charges without prosecutorial assistance. The potential for abuse inherent in the relationship
was recognized recently in ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.5 (Approved
Draft, 1971), by the recommendation that when the prosecutor is legal advisor to the grand
jury, he may explain the law "appropriately" and express an opinion on the legal significance
of the evidence provided "due deference" is accorded to the jury as an independent legal body.
The prosecutor should not make statements or arguments that would be impermissible at trial
and would influence the grand jury, and all statements of the prosecutor should be on the
record. The commentary to § 3.5 states:
A prosecutor should not, however, take advantage of his role as the ex parte repre-
sentative of the state before the grand jury to unduly or unfairly influence it in voting
upon charges brought before it. In general, he should be guided by the standards
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tually every jurisdiction the prosecutor is the statutorily appointed
legal advisor to the grand jury and has free access to the jury room
except during deliberations. 92 Relying primarily upon the results of
prior police investigations," the prosecutor orchestrates the proceed-
ings: the evidence is presented in the order and form determined by
him,94 witnesses are examined by him,'5 and the indictment is pre-
pared and submitted to the grand jury by him." In deciding whether
to return an indictment, and if so, the appropriate charge, the grand
jury must rely on the prosecutor's analysis of the legal significance
of the evidence."
governing and defining the proper presentation of the state's case in an adversary
trial before a petit jury.
As a general matter, however, the law provides no remedy when the prosecutor acts inappro-
priately or fails to accord due deference to the grand jury.
92 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2939.10 (Page 1975): "The prosecuting attorney or
assistant prosecuting attorney may at all times appear before the grand jury to give information
relative to a matter cognizable by it, or advice upon a legal matter when required."
'" See, e.g., id., which imposes a duty on the prosecutor to present to the grand jury
"information relative to a matter cognizable by it. ... The prosecutor, in turn, relies on
the police for such information. See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.04 at 6-66 (2d ed. 1976):
"Assisted by the various federal police agencies, the United States Attorney and his staff
investigate matters which may lead to indictment, develop the evidence, and marshal it before
the grand jury."
91 In many jurisdictions the prosecuting attorney as well as the grand jury is authorized
to subpoena witnesses. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2939.12 (Page 1975), which provides that
the clerk shall issue a subpoena when "required by the grand jury, prosecuting attorney, or
judge . . . ." In many states the prosecutor has an absolute right to question witnesses. E.g..
id. Even when subpoenas are issued formally in the name of the grand jury, they are in reality
instrumentalities of the prosecutor. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 89-90 (3d
Cir. 1973):
[Allthough federal grand juries are called into existence by order of the district court
. . . they are "basically . . . a law enforcement agency." . . . They are for all
practical purposes an investigative and prosecutorial arm of the executive branch of
government ....
* * . although grand jury subpoenas are occasionally discussed as if they were
the instrumentalities of the grand jury, they are in fact almost universally instrumen-
talities of the United States Attorney's office ....
'S E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2939.12 (Page 1975). Although grand juries in most
jurisdictions have legal power to institute and conduct an investigation it rarely occurs in
practice. ABA STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.4 (Approved Draft, 1971), appar-
ently would deny the grand jury the legal power to act independently of the prosecutor in any
case. It takes the position that the decision to charge should be the primary responsibility of
the prosecutor; citizen complaints should be screened first by the prosecutor for "prior ap-
proval" before submission to the grand jury, and the prosecutor's action or recommendation
should be communicated to the grand jury.
" A grand jury composed of nonlawyers hardly could be expected to draft an indictment
sufficient to comply with the technical rules of criminal pleading. The indictment ordinarily is
drafted by the prosecutor and submitted to the grand jury for its approval. See, e.g., United
States v. Gower, 447 F.2d 187 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850 (1971). See generally 8
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.02[2][c] (2d ed. 1976).
'" For example, the grand jury could not be expected to distinguish among the different
degrees of homicide. The dependency of the grand jury on the prosecutor is formalized and
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The observation that the modern grand jury has become little
more than a "rubber stamp" for the prosecuting attorney is not a
recent one. In their 1922 study of the Cleveland court system, Pound
and Frankfurter concluded that:
As a matter of fact, the grand jury does little more than register
in formal shape the opinion of the prosecuting attorney that there
is sufficient proof to warrant a trial. Very rarely does the grand jury
indict when the opinion of the prosecuting attorney is to the con-
trary, and vice versa.9"
. . . Generally, the grand jury does little more than rubber-
stamp the opinion of the prosecutor. It is almost exclusively depen-
dent upon him for its knowledge of the law, and for its information
on the facts it is almost entirely dependent on his zeal and willing-
ness.
99
The empirical studies that have been conducted support this
view. 1t° The National Advisory Commission recently recommended
the elimination of the grand jury in all but the most exceptional of
cases, finding the adversarial preliminary hearing a more effective
process for screening out unwarranted charges:
It is unlikely that the grand jury is effective as a buffer between the
State and a person suspected of a criminal offense.The presentation
of evidence is under prosecutorial control and the grand jury merely
agrees to the actions of the prosecutor. In Baltimore, Md., for
example, the grand jury returned indictments in 98.18 percent of
sanctioned by the statutes designating him the legal advisor of the grand jury. See note 92 supra.
" R. POUND AND F. FRANKFURTER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 176 (1922).
" Id. at 212. The grand jury was criticized for its lack of independence from the prosecutor
as early as 1893. See Chaplin, Reform in Criminal Procedure, 7 HARV. L. REV. 189, 191 (1893),
cited in L. ORMELD, supra note 11, at 179-80. The famous Wickersham Report of 1931 sided
with the critics of the grand jury: "The grand jury usually degenerates into a rubber stamp
wielded by the prosecuting officer according to the dictates of his own sense of propriety and
justice. It has ceased to perform or be needed for the function for which it was established." 4
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION
125 (1931).
I" The empirical study most often cited as evidence of the subordinate role of the grand
jury is Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System (pts. 1-3), 10 ORE. L. REV. 101, 217, 295
(193 1). A few critics found the results of the study inconclusive. E.g., Hall, Analysis of Criticism
of the Grand Jury, 22 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 692, 694 (1932). Professor Hall's article was written
in response to Professor Moley's claim that the evidence supports the conclusion that the grand
jury is ineffectual as a check on prosecutorial abuses. See Moley, The Initiation of Criminal
Prosecutions by Indictment or Information, 29 MIcH. L, REv. 403 (1931). If it be assumed
that most prosecutors are responsible public servants, and grand juries rarely are called upon
to deter meritless prosecutions, the percentage of "no true bills" may be considered substantial.
"Indeed, it may be argued that normally the grand jury and the prosecuting attorney should
agree, and that the fact of agreement shows a proper spirit of cooperation." L. ORFIELD, supra
note 11, at 180.
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those cases presented to it in 1969, but 42 percent of those indict-
ments were dismissed before trial ...
In most cities where the grand jury is used it eliminates fewer
than 20 percent of the cases it receives. In Cleveland, Ohio, the
figure is 7 percent; in the District of Columbia, 20 percent; and in
Philadelphia, Pa., 2 to 3 percent.
The Special Committee on Crime Prevention and Control con-
cluded that the preliminary hearing was a more effective screen for
unfounded prosecutions based on a finding of a lack of probable
cause than was the grand jury.01
Courts and commentators alike have become increasingly critical of
the grand jury in recent years.102 The Supreme Court, while continu-
" 4 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
COURTS 75 (1973).
"I After 32 years on the federal bench, one judge urges the abolition of the grand jury
system:
This great institution of the past has long ceased to be the guardian of the people
for which purpose it was created at Runnymede. Today it is but a convenient tool
for the prosecutor-too often used solely for publicity. Any experienced prosecutor
will admit that he can indict anybody at any time for almost anything before any
grand jury.
Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972). Judge Antell of New Jersey
is of a similar view: "The so-called grand jury "investigation" . . . is really nothing more than
a review of the prosecutor's predigested evidence and a ratification of his conclusions." Antell,
The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment. 51 A.B.A.J. 153, 155 (1965).
Recent literature abounds with expressions of doubt concerning the effectiveness of the
grand jury as a bulwark of liberty. See Weinberg and Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation
to Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis of Section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act
of 1968, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1380 (1969) ("the prosecutor's influence is usually control-
ling.") The grand jury has eroded to the status of "merely another weapon in the government's
fact-finding arsenal." Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury. 61 GEO. L.J. I (1972). It is no longer
a group of peers sitting to protect citizens; instead, it is an arm of the state, more powerful
than ever before, serving the ends of the prosecution. Id. at 35.
In this country numerous studies undertaken to assess the efficacy of the grand jury
have all concluded that it is no longer effective in protecting individuals against
arbitrary prosecutions, and that it no longer exercises the independent judgment
required by due process.
Alexander and Portman, Grand Jury Indictment Versus Prosecution by Information- An
Equal Protection-Due Process Issue, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 997, 1000 (1974).
While the grand jury in England was able to maintain considerable independ-
ence from government prosecutors, the grand jury today is much more dependent
on the prosecutor for its successful operation. Indeed, the grand jury normally hears
only those" cases presented by the prosecutor and only the prosecution's side of those
cases. He is responsible for securing the attendance of witnesses whom he selects.
and also for the presentation of other evidence. He conducts the examination of
witnesses, instructs the grand jurors as to what laws are alleged to have been violated.
and draws the indictment. As a public official and lawyer, the prosecutor may also
command considerable respect from the lay persons constituting the grand jury.
With his added responsibility and power comes the danger that the prosecutor
may also be able to prejudice or even manipulate the grand jurors and obtain an
indictment when there may not be sufficient evidence to hold an accused for trial.
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ing to indorse the grand jury as an institution, nonetheless has recog-
nized that it "may not always serve its historic role as a protective
bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an over-
zealous prosecutor ....
Not surprisingly, those who have urged the abolition of the
grand jury have claimed that it is ineffectual as a check against
wrongful prosecution.'"' In 1850 an abolitionist delegate to a state
constitutional convention contested the historical claim that the
grand jury system defended the rights of the people.
To those who tell us that the Grand Jury was established in Eng-
land, and has been used for the protection of the rights and privi-
leges and freedom of the people, I would reply, that History does
not sustain them in that position. In all the important State trials
in England, from the time of Sidney down to the trial of the great
Irish agitator, O'Connell, the Grand Jury has not been effective in
the service of popular rights. . . .History will bear me out in the
assertion that whenever it has suited the interests or the will of the
King to have this or that subject indicted, whether the object was
the ruin of private character or the . . . sequestration of rich es-
This conduct may take several forms and may occur at different stages in the indict-
ment process. It may occur, for example, when the prosecutor is permitted to use
abusive language when discussing the character of the accused before the grand jury.
The prosecutor may also attempt to create preindictment publicity, which might
include unsubstantiated factual assertions, in the hope of inflaming public sentiment
and reaching prospective grand jurors.
Johnston, The Grand Jury-Prosecutorial Abuse of the Indictment Process, 65 J. CRINI. L.C.
& P.S. 157, 160-61 (1974).
"I United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 17 (1973). Justice Douglas in dissent was less
charitable: "l[It is, indeed, common knowledge that the grand jury, having been conceived as
a bulwark between the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive." Id. at 23.
Justice Marshall, also in dissent, recognized that serious fourth amendment problems arise
when the grand jury fails to exercise its "historic role":
Whatever the present day validity of the historical assumption of neutrality that
underlies the grand jury process, it must at least be recognized that if a grand jury
is deprived of the independence essential to the assumption of neutrality-if it effec-
tively surrenders that independence to a prosecutor-the dangers of excessive and
unreasonable official interference with personal liberty are exactly those that the
Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent.
Id. at 46.
"I1 In England the movement to abolish the grand jury began as early as 1825 with Jeremy
Bentham. who claimed then that the grand jury had outlived its usefulness by more than a
century. The abolitionists finally succeeded; the grand jury was rarely used in England after
World War I and was formally abolished in 1933. See YOUNGER, supra note I, at 56-71, 134-
54: L. ORFIELD, supra note II, at 140, 191. The abolitionists in this country have enjoyed less
success; the grand jury has not been wholly abolished in any state. See note 5 supra. Nearly
half of the states permit prosecution of most felonies by information or indictment at the option
of the prosecutor. Much of the reform movement occurred in western and midwestern states
during the nineteenth century. See generally R. YOUNGER, supra.
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tates, or the gratification of private pique and animosity, the Grand
Jury has ever been found the willing instrument of the Crown." 5
One need not resolve the controversy to conclude that the grand
jury is an inappropriate substitute for the neutral and detached mag-
istrate required by the fourth amendment. The grand jury falls far
short of the detachment test of Shadwick. Regardless of whether it
is always (or even sometimes) the rubber stamp of the prosecutor, it
is clear that the functions of grand jury and prosecutor are intimately
related. Indeed, in the states where prosecution by information is
allowed, prosecutor and grand jury share the function of bringing an
accusation. To perform their tasks well, grand jury and prosecutor
must establish a close working relationship with mutual dependency
and support. The grand jury simply could not function if it were to
maintain a condition of "severance and disengagement" from the
prosecutor. It cannot be free of the potentially distorting connection
with the prosecutor condemned by the Court in Shadwick.10' Its
situation is not at all similar to that of the Tampa clerks who had
"no connection with any law enforcement activity or authority which
would distort the independent judgment the Fourth Amendment re-
quires.""' The fact that the grand jury functions in secret with no one
present but the prosecutor is reflective of the intimate relationship
and the serious potential for distortion. If the grand jury, together
with police and prosecutor, is a part of the "competitive enterprise,"
it is not material that it has also on occasion performed the "historic
role"' of guardian of the innocent. We should reconsider the wisdom
of our "willingness to let a grand jury's judgment substitute for that
of a neutral and detached magistrate."'' 9
IV. THE CAPACITY OF THE GRAND JURY
The second requirement of Shadwick for fourth amendment
magistrates is the capacity to make probable cause decisions." 0 Since
the decision ultimately is a conclusion of law, it is obvious that law-
yers should be best qualified for the task. But the Court in Shadwick
rejected a per se rule that only lawyers are competent to serve as
I" I DEBATES IN INDIANA CONVENTION 136-37 (1850). The rule of grand jury secrecy was
castigated as "anti-American." Id. at 149-50.
I" See text accompanying note 65 supra.
t' 407 U.S. at 350-51.
13 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
'' Id.
IS The warrant issuing magistrate "must be capable of determining whether probable
cause exists for the requested arrest or search." 407 U.S. at 350.
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magistrates."' The Tampa city clerks were not lawyers and were not
required to have formal legal training. The Court did recognize that
it would be preferable to have lawyers or judges serving as magis-
trates,"12 but, weighing the need for flexibility at the state level, de-
cided that nonlawyers could serve as magistrates "so long as all are
. . . capable of the probable-cause determination required of
them."" 3
In part, the Tampa city clerks were found capable of performing
their fourth amendment tasks because their authority to issue arrest
warrants extended only to ordinance violations, the most simple of
offenses. They had no authority to issue warrants for violations of the
state code."' Another significant factor was the nature of the position
of clerk. By reason of daily job responsibilities, they were in more or
less constant contact with the courts and the law, and could be ex-
pected to have an understanding of the city ordinances through these
experiences. Moreover, they were subject to supervision by the mu-
nicipal court judges and presumably would have ready access to the
courts for advice. Accordingly, because of the clerk's position,
We presume. . . he would be able to deduce from the facts on an
affidavit before him whether there was probable cause to believe a
citizen guilty of impaired driving, breach of peace, drunkenness,
trespass, or the multiple other common offenses covered by a mu-
nicipal code."'
The finding of capacity in Shadwick must be limited to the facts
of that case. It does not mean that any nonlawyer, regardless of
position or experience, can be given the task of deciding fourth
amendment probable cause with respect to any criminal offense no
matter how serious or complex. Certainly, the Court would have
reached a different result if that had been the question raised in
Shadwick. Yet, that is precisely the result when fourth amendment
responsibilities are entrusted to the grand jury.
To qualify as a grand juror a person need have no prior training
or experience in the law."' Indeed, it might well be unconstitutional
See note 61 supra.
112 "All this is not to imply that a judge or lawyer would not normally provide the most
desirable review of warrant requests." 407 U.S. at 353.
" Id. at 354.
" Id. at 347.
in ld. at 351.
", Prominent in its folklore we find frequent reference to the fact that grand
juries are populated by people of high and low estate, from all vocational back-
grounds except law and law enforcement. It is somehow suggested that there is some
special merit in confiding these important responsibilities to a group of citizens who
are completely untrained in the work they have to do . . ..
Antell, supra note 102, at 154.
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to impose such requirements for jury duty." 7 Jurors generally are
selected from lists of registered voters, city directories, or other
sources from which a random selection of a fair cross section of the
community can be made. Typically, the only statutory qualification
is that grand jurors be resident electors of the county."" Thus jurors
possess none of the characteristics that qualified the Tampa city
clerks as fourth amendment magistrates. Without significant prior
experience with the criminal laws, they are called upon to process
cases of great factual and legal complexity."' It is both unfair and
absurd to impose upon such persons the responsibility for complex
legal decisions on which the evidence and the law may be complicated
and extensive.2 0While the grand jury cannot be expected to function competently
when the evidence is presented to it by the prosecuting attorney, it is
even more unrealistic to expect it to conduct an independent investi-
gation into criminal activity.'' As one state court judge has observed:
It is really unthinkable that there could be a productive grand
jury investigation that has not been preceded by a prolonged period
of study and preparation by a prosecutor's office. Who can believe
that even a moderately complex inquiry can be managed by twenty-
three untrained people who must work within the framework of the
law? . . . The so-called jury "investigation," therefore, is really
nothing more than a review of the prosecutor's predigested evidence
and a ratification of his conclusion. 22
As noted above,'2 the grand jury has the legal authority to conduct
an independent investigation, but lacks the expertise and resources
needed to accomplish it. The law provides the grand jury with no
investigatory personnel or resources independent of the prosecuting
"I No particular race or class of citizens may be systematically excluded from service on
the grand jury. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The constitutional ideal is
to select jurors at random from a fair cross section of the community. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1861
(1970) (all citizens eligible with very limited exceptions).
"A See. e.g.. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2939.02 (Page 1975).
M Ironically, in those states that require grand jury indictments, the requirement usually
extends only to felonies. Thus, while the Tampa city clerks were not involved in any felony
cases, grand juries generally hear only felonies.
I" See, e.g., Foster, Grand Jury Practice in the 1970's, 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 701 (1971) (grand
jury process is inappropriate in antitrust prosecutions).
M It should be noted that the investigative function of the grand jury is different from
the accusatorial function. In most cases the jury hears only the evidence offered by the prosecu-
tor, which ordinarily is the product of a prior police investigation. When a grand jury investiga-
tion occurs, it is usually controlled by the prosecutor and is used to supplement the independent
investigation of police authorities. In many respects, the grand jury is an investigative device
which offers the prosecutor advantages that a police investigation does not. See note 179 infra.
'1 Antell, supra note 102, at 155.
'2 See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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attorney. It is not authorized to employ independent legal counsel or
investigators, and only in extreme cases may it demand a special
prosecutor." 4
Virtually no preparation or training is afforded persons selected
for jury duty. At best they may be given copies of a grand jury
handbook that only defines in general terms the duties, powers, and
responsibilities of the grand jury.' Often the court's charge to the
jury, delivered at the beginning of its term, is equally vague and
general in content.' The jury is not advised that it is functioning as
a fourth amendment magistrate, nor is it instructed with respect to
evidentiary requirements for the issuance of a warrant.'27 Thus, al-
though it may be told that it should not return an indictment unless
probable cause is shown,' s the practical result often is an indictment
based upon evidence that would not support the issuance of an arrest
warrant. 2  Rarely is the jury instructed on the elements of specific
crimes.'30 For meaningful legal advice it must look to the prosecutor,
'" Although such appointments [of special prosecutors] are rarely made, most
states authorize appointment of a special prosecutor in a grand jury investigation of
alleged criminal activities of the prosecutor or his staff, and several also would
appear to permit appointment for other investigations upon a showing that the
prosecutor has not furnished the grand jury with sufficient legal or investigative
assistance.
KAMISAR, supra note 5, at 880.
I" Typically, the handbooks foster dependency and reliance on the prosecutor without
advising or encouraging the grand jury to conduct its investigations independently.
The United States Attorney will be actively engaged before the Grand Jury in
presenting one by one the formal charges and in calling the witnesses to support
them. Since he is a public official, usually of experience in this work and of both
intelligence and sincerity, he will naturally be the constant legal advisor to the Grand
Jury.
FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 16 (1959). See also STATE GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 17
(1959).
I See, e.g., Fletcher, J., Charge to a Grand Jury, 18 F.R.D. 211 (1956); Kaufman, J.,
The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Powers, 17 F.R.D. 331 (1955); Yankwich, J., Charge to
Grand Jury, 16 F.R.D. 93 (1955).
"I The court's charge is rarely couched in fourth amendment terms. See. e.g.. id.
IL See text accompanying notes 12 & 13 supra.
I" For a fourth amendment definition of probable cause see, e.g., Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). While the typical charge to a grand jury is not cast
precisely in fourth amendment terms, it has been held that probable cause to arrest may be
subsumed within the concept of probable cause to indict. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
In reality, however, even though theoretically the standard for charging the accused with a
crime may be higher than that for arrest, the grand jury is not bound by the same evidentiary
rules as a magistrate. Thus, an indictment may be based upon unsupported hearsay and opin-
ion. See text accompanying note 147 infra.
"I0 The absence of adequate instruction may be significant when the jury should consider
the subtle distinctions of the degrees of the same crime. For example, the jury must rely on
the opinion of the prosecutor in deciding whether to charge first or second degree murder. Yet,
for plea bargaining, fixing bail, and other purposes, the prosecutor may have an interest in
charging the greater.
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who might be the only person in the grand jury room not hopelessly
confused by the proceedings.
In short, the only person who has a clear idea of what is hap-
pening in the grand jury room is the public official whom these
twenty-three novices are expected to check. So that even if a grand
jury were disposed to assert its historic independence in the interest
of an individual's liberty, it must, paradoxically, look to the very
person whose misconduct they are supposed to guard against for
guidance as to when he is acting oppressively.'
The circle is complete. By reason of its incapacity to perform its
assigned tasks, the grand jury cannot be severed and disengaged from
the prosecutor.3 2 As a functioning institution it satisfies neither of
the requirements of Shadwick.
V. HEARSAY AND PROBABLE CAUSE
In addition to problems of detachment and capacity, there are
other reasons why the grand jury is not an appropriate body to render
fourth amendment decisions. As noted above, 33 the constitutional
requirement of a neutral and detached magistrate and the judicial
preference for the warrant process in lieu of warrantless arrests are
premised upon the value of interposing a disinterested magistrate
between the citizen and state officials engaged in the "competitive
enterprise." To preserve that value, and to maintain the fourth
amendment as a meaningful constitutional protection, the probable
cause decision must represent an independent evaluation of the facts.
If the magistrate issues a warrant based solely on conclusory allega-
tions by the police, unsupported by statements of fact, the magistrate
has become the rubber stamp of the police and the fourth amendment
is reduced to a nullity. Thus, when a police officer is seeking a war-
rant it is not enough that he merely state his belief or opinion that
the suspect has committed an offense; 134 a particularized factual
"I Antell, supra note 102, at 154.
122 The grand jury is not a proper body to reach an "independent judicial
determination" of prqbable cause. Its determination is unlikely to be "judicial"
because it is composed of laymen, whose sole guidance on legal questions will nor-
mally come from the prosecutor. Its determination is also unlikely to be
"independent" in most cases because, in practice, the prosecutor's influence is
usually controlling.
Weinberg and Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: An
Analysis of Section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1361, 1380
(1969).
I See text accompanying note 47 supra.
' See cases cited note 49 supra, Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933).
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showing of probable cause is required.' Similarly, a hearsay affida-
vit of a police officer which states only the belief or opinion of an
informant is insufficient under the fourth amendment since it does
not afford the magistrate an opportunity to draw the necessary infer-
ences from the facts. 3 ' But not all forms of hearsay are excluded
from consideration. Because of the differences between a determina-
tion of guilt at trial and a determination of probable cause, the magis-
trate is not limited to consideration of evidence that would be admis-
sible at trial;'37 an affidavit reciting hearsay information may sup-
port the issuance of a warrant, "so long as a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay is presented."' 38 Thus a warrant may issue on
the basis of an informant's information rather than the direct per-
sonal evidence of the affiant if the information is reasonably corro-
borated by other matters within the affiant's knowledge.'
The rules governing the use of hearsay in various factual con-
texts are quite complex. The seminal case is Aguilar v. Texas.4 '
Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and
need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, ...
the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circum-
stances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were
where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstan-
ces from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose
identity need not be disclosed, . . . was "credible . . . ." Other-
wise, "the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint"
will be drawn not "by a neutral and detached magistrate," as the
Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer .... "I
The requirements of Aguilar were described later as a "two-pronged
test."'' 2 The affidavit in support of the issuance of the warrant must
show underlying circumstances sufficient to enable a magistrate to
'" In most jurisdictions, the showing is made under oath by affidavit rather than by oral
testimony. See. e.g.. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a):
If it appears from the complaint [which must be upon oath under rule 31, or from
an affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint, that there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed
it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by
law to execute it.
131 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
'3, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960).
'3 Id. at 269. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (probable cause for
warrantless arrest may be based upon substantiated hearsay); Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(1971). Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
"I9 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 271. If other corroborating facts are shown, it may
not even be necessary to identify the informant. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
14- 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
I d. at 114-15.
2 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969).
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independently judge the validity of the informant's information and
must support the claim that the informant is credible or the informa-
tion is reliable. 143 A warrant could not be issued on less of a factual
showing "without diluting important safeguards that assure that the
judgment of a disinterested judicial officer will interpose itself be-
tween the police and the citizenry."' 44
If we are to entrust the function of a magistrate to the grand jury
we should require no less. If the return of a grand jury indictment is
a sufficient basis for the issuance of an arrest warrant or continued
detention of the accused without further judicial inquiry into probable
cause, the grand jury should be required to observe the same stan-
dards of evidence. To permit an indictment to be based on hearsay
that is insufficient for the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate
makes the grand jury a mere rubber stamp for the conclusory claims
of the prosecutor's witnesses and reduces the fourth amendment to a
meaningless form. But the Court has yet to impose the Aguilar
requirements on grand juries, and it is unlikely that it ever will.
In Costello v. United States,4 5 the defendant moved to dismiss
the indictment on the ground that the only evidence presented to the
grand jury was the hearsay testimony of federal agents. The motion
was based upon the grand jury clause of the fifth amendment, rather
than fourth amendment grounds. Indeed, dismissal of the indictment
would not have been a proper remedy for a violation of the fourth
amendment.' Defendant argued that an indictment based solely on
hearsay violated his right to a grand jury indictment. The argument
was rejected by the Court.
[Nleither the Fifth Amendment nor any other constitutional provi-
sion prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries must
act. . . .In fact, grand jurors could act on their own knowledge
and were free to make their presentments or indictments on such
information as they deemed satisfactory. 4 '
"3 Id. at 413.
i, Id. at 419. See also United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971). which distinguished
Aguilar and Spinelli but did not change the basic fourth amendment principle.
"s 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
"I The remedy for a fourth amendment violation is the exclusionary rule. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Accordingly, to raise the issue in a fourth amendment context, the
defendant must make a motion to suppress evidence seized during the search incidental to the
arrest made pursuant to the warrant which issued as a matter of course upon the return of the
indictment. No reported cases have been found involving a similar fact situation. Instead, the
cases that raise the question of sufficiency of evidence before the grand jury do so in the context
of a motion to dismiss on grounds of the fifth amendment grand jury clause (or its state
constitutional equivalent).
" 350 U.S. at 362.
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Moreover, the fifth amendment requires no preliminary evidentiary
showing when the accused is charged by a prosecutor's information.
An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand
jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its
face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth
Amendment requires nothing more. 4 '
While Costello is not a fourth amendment case, it does state that
there is no "other constitutional provision" that "prescribes the kind
of evidence upon which grand juries must act."' Grand jurors may
still rely upon their personal knowledge, even if not supported by
evidence presented in the jury room, as a basis for indictment. 10
There was no discussion in Costello of the constitutional value
of interposing the independent judgment of the grand jury between
police and citizenry. More persuasive to the Court was the desire to
avoid delay in the criminal process.
If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that
there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury,
the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a rule
would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could always
insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the competency
and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury.'
From a fifth amendment perspective the choice made in Costello
makes some sense. Quite apart from problems of grand jury secrecy
and discovery of grand jury transcripts, it may be argued that an
indictment based solely on hearsay causes the defendant no harm at
trial. Guilt or innocence ultimately will be decided by a different jury
which will hear only legally competent evidence. Were an indictment
dismissed for insufficient evidence, the prosecutor need only to return
to the grand jury, armed with better evidence, to obtain a second
"I Id. at 363. This is consistent with Pugh, in which the Court concluded that the accused
is only entitled to a probable cause determination as a condition of any significant pretrial
restraint on liberty. There is no right to dismissal of the charge. See note 23 supra.
"' Acting consistently with Costello, the Court has held that an indictment should not be
dismissed solely because it is based upon evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966); Lawn v. United States, 355
U.S. 339 (1958).
I" Many states have statutory provisions imposing a duty upon jurors to report to the
grand jury any information they have that an indictable offense has been committed. E.g., IND.
CODE § 35-1-15-15 (1971); CAL. PENAL CODE § 918 (West 1970).
"1 350 U.S. at 363. This policy was restated in United States v. Calandra. in which the
court observed that to permit a witness to make a motion to suppress in the grand jury room
would "saddle a grand jury with minitrials." 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974) (quoting United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)). The issue raised in Calandra is quite different from
that which is addressed in this article.
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indictment. 5 2 In such a case, the defendant has gained nothing be-
yond mere delay.
It is quite a different matter, however, when viewed in the
context of the fourth amendment, for here, a determination that an
indictment was returned on less than probable cause could have an
immense impact. Suppose that a person arrested without a warrant
is subsequently indicted on evidence insufficient to establish probable
cause in the fourth amendment sense. If the return of the indictment
is an event that forecloses the accused's right to a preliminary hear-
ing, and such a hearing was not conducted prior to indictment, the
defendant will suffer the consequences of continued detention. Ob-
viously, the harm would be more severe to a defendant who is unable
to meet the conditions of bail or other pretrial release, but the conse-
quences could also be harmful to those who can, since the evidence
presented at a probable cause hearing might require immediate un-
conditional release or support an argument for lesser conditions of
release. Moreover, it is impossible to distinguish such a case from
that of Pugh. In Pugh, the Court condemned a procedure whereby a
person could be detained for a significant period of time without a
meaningful fourth amendment probable cause determination. Why
should the grand jury be permitted to achieve a result forbidden to
the prosecutor? It might often be the case that the prosecutor could
secure an indictment against a defendant even though he could not
establish fourth amendment probable cause before a magistrate.
Continued detention of the accused after indictment would constitute
a significant deprivation of liberty for which the law provides no
remedy. The purpose and intent of the Court's rationale in Pugh
applies to such a case. No rational purpose can be served by the
disparate treatment of such a defendant and those who are charged
by information.
A second illustration presents the fourth amendment problem
even more graphically. Suppose that a grand jury indicts a defendant
for gambling on the basis of evidence that would not be sufficient to
establish probable cause before a magistrate. The defendant is not
under arrest at the time of indictment, but when the indictment is
returned a warrant of arrest is issued as a matter of course with no
further inquiry into probable cause. When the defendant is arrested
pursuant to the warrant, his person is searched and he is found to be
carrying a concealed weapon. The defendant then is charged with
"I This presumes, of course, that the prosecutor's only motive is to gain a conviction and
not merely to harass the accused with an unfounded accusation.
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carrying a concealed weapon and the gambling indictment is nol-
prossed.
The problem is self-evident. Can the defendant suppress the
weapon as the fruit of a search pursuant to a warrant unsupported
by a showing of probable cause? Clearly, the weapon would be sup-
pressed were the warrant issued by a magistrate. But here, the defen-
dant can only move to suppress by challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence before the grand jury that indicted him for gambling. Fol-
lowing the statement in Costello that there are no constitutional limi-
tations on the kinds of evidence upon which a grand jury may act,
coupled with Justice Powell's footnote in Pugh that the grand jury's
determination of probable cause is "conclusive,"'. 3 we reach the
anomalous result of a patent violation of fourth amendment rights
with no exclusionary remedy. Thus, from a fourth amendment
perspective, Costello and its ramifications are unacceptable.5 4 The
fourth amendment violation does have serious consequences. The
right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the
grand jury may mean the difference between conviction and acquittal
for the firearms violation.
One could envision several solutions to the problem. The least
desirable, from both fourth and fifth amendment standpoints, would
be to require the grand jury to follow the two-pronged Aguilar test
in reaching a verdict and to refuse to indict if fourth amendment
probable cause is not shown-that is, if the grand jury grounds an
indictment on hearsay, it must requirb facts sufficient to afford an
independent judgment of the validity of the hearsay and facts suffi-
cient to support the claim that the informant is credible or the infor-
mation reliable. 5 This would require educating the jurors with re-
I See text accompanying note 24 supra.
"I To some, Costello may not be acceptable as a fifth amendment standard. See. e.g..
United States v. Arcuri, 282 F. Supp. 347, 349 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 405 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1968).
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 913 (1969) (relying on hearsay instead of direct testimony is
"pernicious"). In United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 1966), the court stated
that
excessive use of hearsay in the presentation of government cases to grand juries tends
to destroy the historical function of grand juries in assessing the likelihood of prose-
cutorial success and tends to destroy the protection from unwarranted prosecutions
that grand juries are supposed to afford to the innocent.
It has been observed that Costello opened wide the floodgates for wholesale use of hearsay
before the grand jury. E.g., 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 9 6.03[2], at 6-44 (2d ed. 1976):
As a result of Costello, indictments are commonly obtained entirely on hearsay
evidence; the customary practice is to use only the investigating agent who presents
to the grand jury the information in his file. The prosecutor's motive, in addition to
simple convenience, is to avoid putting primary witnesses before the grand jury so
there can be no possibility of impeachment by prior inconsistent testimony ....
'1 See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
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spect to the legal requirements. However, because of the complexity
of the rules, it may well be a practical impossibility to provide a
meaningful education. In addition, to follow this course would be to
define probable cause to indict as the equivalent of probable cause
to arrest. It may be more desirable, as the Court recognized in Pugh,
to separate the two concepts. Perhaps we should retain the option of
requiring an accused to appear for trial without a showing of fourth
amendment probable cause so long as there are no significant pretrial
restraints on liberty. Moreover, to put meaning into the fourth
amendment, it would be necessary to provide for a subsequent review
of the grand jury evidence and provide an appropriate remedy (exclu-
sion of evidence or release from confinement) when the indictment is
not supported by the record.
A second option would be to put a magistrate in the grand jury
room to hear the evidence and make the fourth amendment probable
cause decision. This may be equally undesirable as a waste of judicial
resources and presents the same problems with respect to subsequent
judicial review and remedies.
The simplest and most desirable solution is to extend the rule of
Pugh to prosecutions by either information or indictment, not using
the indictment as a justification for either continued detention or the
issuance of an arrest warrant. It would not be an intolerable burden
to require a Pugh-type probable cause determination by a neutral and
detached magistrate after the indictment is returned. In this way,
basic fourth amendment values could be preserved without a major
modification of the grand jury system.
Whichever course is chosen, it must be recognized that the
Costello standard is incompatible with established fourth amendment
principles. If we are to accept the grand jury as a substitute for a
neutral and detached magistrate we should, at the very least, require
that both abide by the same fourth amendment rules.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A magistrate's decision with respect to fourth amendment prob-
able cause is reviewable at the trial and appellate levels. In the trial
court, the defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground
that there was insufficient evidence before the magistrate to support
the issuance of a warrant. Or if there has been a Pugh-type probable
cause determination, the defendant may move for release from cus-
tody by motion, habeas corpus, or any other appropriate procedure
that challenges the sufficiency of the evidence before the magistrate.
Should the trial court refuse to suppress the evidence or order release
from confinement, that decision is reviewable by courts of appellate
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jurisdiction. In the case of warrants, the federal rules require that the
probable cause evidence be reduced to writing and presented to the
magistrate in the form of a complaint and supporting affidavits.'
These documents comprise the record, and the defendant may chal-
lenge its sufficiency. If the evidence is facially insufficient, any evi-
dence seized pursuant to a search incidental to the arrest will be
suppressed.' 57 In addition, many courts will permit a subfacial attack
on the affidavits when they are facially sufficient to establish probable
cause but the facts stated therein are false. 158 Likewise, the action of
a police officer in making a warrantless arrest is subject to review by
the courts, and appropriate remedies are available to the accused if
the officer acted without probable cause.5 9
Probable cause decisions of trial courts are reviewable by courts
of appellate jurisdiction. As a standard for review, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Ventresca6 ° adopted a rule of reason:
[Wihen a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should
not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hyper-
technical, rather than a commonsense, manner. . . . [T]he resolu-
tion of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.'"
The standard for review of warrantless arrests is at least as stringent
as that applied to review of magistrates, if, indeed, a higher standard
does not apply.'62 Thus probable cause decisions of magistrates and
M FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a). See note 135 supra. By reducing the evidence to affidavit form,
a record is made which readily permits a later review of the magistrate's decision. See, e.g..
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485 (1958) (Rules 3 and 4. by requiring written
and sworn complaints, implement the fourth amendment). See also United States v. Anderson,
453 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1971); Frazier v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1971).
'5 See, e.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). Even when an officer is
acting in justifiable reliance on a radio bulletin that an arrest warrant was issued, a subsequent
determination that the affidavit is insufficient invalidates the arrest and search. See Whitely v.
Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971): "[Aln otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from
challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest."
' Although the issue has not been decided by the Supreme Court, these jurisdictions
represent the better view. As one commentator has stated,
sub-facial attacks should, as a matter of fourth amendment law, be permitted with-
out restriction, for they go to the very heart of the protection of privacy. Prohibiting
sub-facial attacks or imposing restrictions that are functionally equivalent to prohibi-
tion "reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words."
Herman, Warrants for Arrest or Search: Impeaching the Allegations of a Facially Sufficient
Affidavit, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 760 (1975).
I See. e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963).
I 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
Id. at 109.
, See, e.g., Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971); Wong Sun v. United States,
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police officers are not conclusive. When a defendant is arrested or
held in custody as a consequence of a probable cause determination
by magistrate or police, that decision is subject to review in the trial
and appellate courts, and there is a complex body of rules governing
the resolution of this issue.
A historical interpretation of the fourth amendment supports the
view that access to the courts for review of probable cause determina-
tions may be a constitutional requirement. In Pugh, the Court looked
to the "common law that has guided interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment,""'6 and found that it was customary, if not obligatory,
for an arrested person to be taken before a justice of the peace shortly
after arrest for a determination of probable cause."' And the decision
of the justice was subject to review:
The initial determination of probable cause also could be reviewed
by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus. . . . This practice
furnished the model for criminal procedure in America immediately
following the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. 6'
How different is the effect of a probable cause determination by
a grand jury! According to Justice Powell's footnote in Pugh, not
only does it substitute the judgment of a grand jury for that of a
neutral and detached magistrate, but it gives the decision of the grand
jury conclusive effect. The footnote states that the return of an
indictment "conclusively determines the existence of probable cause
and requires issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry."'6 6
This idea is not new to the law. Many courts have adopted the rule
that the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury is not re-
viewable at trial or on appeal.' 7
As a practical matter, adequate review of grand jury evidence
may not be possible, even if permitted by law, since few jurisdictions,
if any, require a record to be made of grand jury proceedings."6 The
371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). In Ventresca, the Court suggested that an even higher standard
should be imposed on police who act without warrants. Because of the judicial preference for
the warrant process, "in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustain-
able where without one it would fail." 380 U.S. at 106 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 270 (1960)).
"t 420 U.S. at 114.
,II Id. at 114-15.
I, d. at 115-16.
', See note 24 supra and a'ccompanying text.
17 E.g.. Parton v. State, 455 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. App. 1970). It should be noted, however,
that virtually all of the cases were decided in the context of a motion to dismiss rather than a
motion to suppress evidence.
"I The federal circuits are unanimously of the view that recording is permissive and not
mandatory. See. e.g., United States v. Trice, 476 F.2d 89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 843
(1973): United States v. Skolick, 474 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Heckman.
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defendant may be precluded by the absence of a record from demon-
strating the insufficiency of the evidence on a motion to suppress,
even if, in fact, probable cause was not established before the grand
jury. In such a case the fourth amendment indeed is reduced "to a
form of words."' 9 Even where an adequate record of the proceedings
is made, the defendant is often denied access to it. There is no doc-
trine more sanctified by history and law than that of grand jury
secrecy, and courts and legislatures have been extremely reluctant to
broaden the scope of discovery. 7 ' Under the present federal rules,
grand jury transcripts are available to the defendant only "upon a
showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indict-
ment because of matters occurring before the grand jury."17 ' The only
discovery allowed as a matter of right is that the accused may have
a copy of his or her own recorded testimony before a grand jury. 72
The ancient cry of grand jury secrecy could be used to deny the
accused an opportunity to raise the fourth amendment claim.
The problem of judicial review of the grand jury is significant.
Federal magistrates, who are usually lawyers, are subject to review
with respect to their fourth amendment decisions. Even though they
may be neutral and detached, they occasionally err. It is the fact of
judicial review which puts meaning into the fourth amendment. How
hollow and empty would be the right to privacy and to freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure if these questions could not be re-
viewed meaningfully in court! Grand juries are even less deserving
than magistrates of insulation from judicial review. Since they may
be neither neutral and detached nor capable of the fourth amendment
decision, and are permitted to act on less evidence than a magistrate,
479 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Biondo, 483 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied.
415 U.S. 947 (1974); United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 404 U.S.
824 (1971).
It is interesting to note, by contrast, that FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(c) gives the accused the
right to a record of the preliminary examination if one is held.
The drafters of the ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 340.3 (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1975) were of the opinion that recording and transcription of grand jury
proceedings should be required in every case. There was a split of opinion, however, as to the
extent to which the transcript should be available to the accused.
' ' See note 158 supra.
'~' See, e.g., United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 (1958); Note.
Disclosure of Grand Jury Minutes to Challenge Indictments and Impeach Witnesses in Federal
Criminal Cases. Ill U. PA. L. REv. 1154 (1963).
M7, FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). The ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §
340.5 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975) requires dismissal of the indictment when the evidence
before the grand jury is insufficient to establish probable cause. This does not reflect the
majority view. The code also would provide the accused a preliminary hearing even after
indictment. Id. § 330.1.
17 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A).
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supervision by the courts is needed if the fourth amendment is to have
meaning.
VII. CONCLUSION
The problems stated above demonstrate serious and unresolved
fourth amendment issues. The grand jury is free to indict on less
evidence than that which would support a probable cause decision by
a magistrate; and, as a result of the return of the indictment, the
accused may be detained in custody or arrested. When the return of
an indictment results in the issuance of an arrest warrant and evi-
dence is seized incidental to the arrest, the defendant is wholly
without legal remedy. Had the evidence been seized by any other
process without a showing of probable cause, it would be subject to
suppression at trial because of the violation of constitutional rights.
The grand jury is the only agency in the criminal process empowered
to violate fourth amendment rights with impunity. Even if it be as-
sumed that most prosecutors and grand juries strive for fairness dur-
ing the indictment process, in a very real sense they are joined to-
gether in the "competitive enterprise" of law enforcement. It is not
enough merely to impose an ethical obligation not to indict without
probable cause. 73 Quite apart from ethics, even when the prosecutor
and grand jury are acting in good faith there is presently nothing in
the law which tells them to refuse to indict when the evidence fails to
establish probable cause in the fourth amendment sense. Since grand
juries may hear as many as ninety cases in one day, often hearing only
brief hearsay evidence of a police officer,'74 it is safe to assume that
many indictments are based upon evidence that would not support the
issuance of a warrant by a magistrate. Yet the consequences are the
same: the accused is arrested or detained in custody by reason of the
return of the indictment.
Apart from fourth amendment problems, the potential for abuse
in the grand jury system is enormous. The process may be abused in
many ways other than unjustified criminal charges or failures to
charge when justified.'75 It can be used to collect evidence for pending
"I See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. No. 7-103, which imposes a
duty on the prosecutor not to institute, or cause to be instituted, criminal charges "when he
knows, or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause." See also ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.6 (Approved Draft, 1971).
"I See Bray, supra note 90.
1"5 For an analysis of five cases (including the Kent State killings) in which there was
substantial evidence meriting public prosecution but grand juries returned "no bills," see Shan-
non, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative Agency of the
Prosecutor?, 2 N.M. L. REV. 141 (1972).
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civil or criminal cases, to collect intelligence data, to coerce perjury
or contempt, or to harass. 178 The process can also be used to protect
police from civil liability for false arrest since the return of an indict-
ment is "conclusive" as to probable cause. It is unnecessary and
inconsistent with basic constitutional values to add fourth amend-
ment violations to the list. 7 '
Since the fourth amendment gives concrete expression to a right
of the people that is basic to a free society,'78 it must prevail over the
most accepted customs and traditions. We should not continue to
accept the grand jury as a substitute for a neutral and detached
magistrate. Police and prosecutors should not be allowed to accom-
plish a result through the grand jury that could not be achieved by
any other process. The contrary result "can serve only to encourage
prosecutorial exploitation of the grand jury process, at the expense
of both individual liberty and the traditional neutrality of the grand
jury."17 9
To fashion the grand jury into an acceptable substitute for a
fourth amendment magistrate would require major modification of
the grand jury system. At a minimum it would involve complete
restructuring of the jury's relationship with the prosecutor with inde-
pendent legal counsel and investigatory resources. It might also re-
quire a substantial training period for jurors and a new set of eviden-
tiary rules for hearing cases. A record would have to be made and
provided to the defense in every case for meaningful review on a
motion to suppress. Grand jury secrecy would be eliminated.
A more practical solution is to acknowledge that the grand jury
is not suited for the tasks of a magistrate. The rule of Pugh should
be extended to cases of grand jury indictment as well as prosecutions
by information. In this way, a probable cause determination by a
magistrate would be interposed between the grand jury and the ac-
cused at little cost to the system, just as Pugh requires the interposi-
tion of a magistrate between the accused and a prosecutor's informa-
"76 See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, REPRESENTATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL
GRAND JURIES ch. 9 (1974).
I A defendant arrested by reason of grand jury indictment rather than a magistrate's
warrant may have an equal protection defense. Cf Alexander and Portman, Grand Jury
Indictment Versus Prosecution by Information-An Equal Protection-Due Process Issue. 25
HASTINGS L.J. 997 (1974), which argues that it is a denial of equal protection to afford an
adversarial preliminary hearing to a defendant charged by information but to deny it to one
charged by indictment.
I's See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
17, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 47 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tion.18 0 Fourth amendment values would be preserved with little or no
change in grand jury procedure. To extend Pugh to prosecutions by
indictment would not frustrate or significantly impair the interests
served by the grand jury process. There is no competing public inter-
est to justify a general exception to the requirements of the fourth
amendment.'8t
IN While it might be preferable to provide an adversarial preliminary examination after
indictment as proposed by the American Law Institute, ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975), the fourth amendment
demands only an exparte probable cause determination by a neutral and detached magistrate.
MR' Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (public interest in fire,
health, and housing code inspections does not justify warrantless search).

